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Abstract
We study competition and cooperation among a group of storage units. As the number of energy
storages increases, the profit of storages approaches zero under competition. We propose two ways
in which storages can achieve the maximum possible profit. The first is a decentralized approach in
which storages incur artificial costs that act as incentives for them to behave as a coalition. No private
information needs to be exchanged between the storages to calculate the artificial cost function. The
second is a centralized approach in which an aggregator coordinates and splits profits with storages in
order to achieve maximum profit. We do not assume the nature of the storage-aggregator relationship and
derive the necessary conditions for longterm cooperation. We use Nash’s axiomatic bargaining problem
to model and predict the profit split between aggregator and storages.
I. INTRODUCTION
LARGE scale introduction energy storage to the grid has the potential to increase the efficiencyof the power system from several dimensions: by shifting load from low to high price
hours, providing reserves, improving power quality, and even defering capital investments [1].
Energy storage is of particular importance to the successful integration of renewable sources into
the power system as it can be used to mitigate their well-known stochasticity and intermittency.
Storage devices range from large pumped hydro plants to household-level storage units (e.g.
Tesla Powerwall [3]). Although the amount of energy storage in the grid is currently limited, it
has recently undergone an unprecedented growth and is expected to continue doing so as costs
are driven down [2]. From a storage owner perspective, these devices are capable of arbitraging
energy in time, by buying energy at low prices and selling it back later at higher prices.
The optimal utilization of storage devices has been explored under both regulated and com-
petitive market environments. In the former, storage is seen as a public asset that is centrally
operated by a system operator (SO) to minimize the operating cost of the system [4], [5], [6],
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2[7]. The latter entails a decentralized operation where storage devices pursue their own objective
(e.g. maximize profits) in a market environment [8].
Storages have been treated as price-takers if their capacity is insufficient to re-shape the system
demand [9], [10]. However, as the number of storages in the system increases, its impact on the
residual demand and electricity prices increases [11], [12]. Therefore storage units would need
to be modeled as price-anticipatory units– units act under the assumption that the other players’
actions influence prices.
Most of research have focused on eliminating market power that arise when storages are
price-anticipatory [13]. In [14] the authors propose a framework in which storage owners auction
physically binding rights to their storage capacity. In [15], it is proposed for the storage owners
to sell financially binding rights via a market operated by the SO. Finally, the authors of [16]
propose a framework in which the storage devices are treated as a communal asset.
There are two common threads in these approaches. The first is that they require a third party
operating the storage devices, which might not necessarily be in the best interests of the storage
owner. The second, and arguably more important, is that these approaches tend to drive storages
out of the market. By eliminating power power, storages tend to make zero profit as their number
increases, and may lead them to leave the market all together.
We take a different viewpoint by encouraging storages to form coalitions and thus achieve
maximum profitability. We adopt the maximum profit as the objective for two main reasons.
Firstly, the social welfare is not easily defined at times. For instance, the maximum social
welfare for all the storage units in a utility service area depends on the objective function of
the utility, which does not necessary represent the least cost solution. Secondly, maximizing the
profit of storage, they are encouraged to stay in the system and may lead to faster adoption of
storage technologies.
This paper studies the arbitrage problem in a market setting, where multiple distributed storage
units compete in a price-anticipatory manner. Due to competition, each unit’s profits is lower
than the profit they would obtain if they had cooperated. The contributions of this paper are two
mechanisms, one distributed and one centralized, that can be used to incentivize cooperation
among a group of storages. These mechanisms that do not require any individual (potentially
private) information to exchanged among participants. They are: i) adding an artificial term to the
cost function of each storage unit; ii) longterm cooperation via an aggregating entity. For each
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3of these mechanisms, we show that self-interested storage units can obtain the profit obtained by
a coalition of cooperating units. We show both mechanisms can achieve the maximum possible
profit.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II the market and storage models are introduced.
We also introduce two scenarios: 1) the grand coalition solution where the aggregate profit is
maximized and the Nash equilibrium where each storage plays a non-cooperative game. In
section III an approach to drive the profit of self-interested storages to the maximum possible
profit via artificial cost functions is presented. In section IV an aggregator model is introduced
and the conditions for longterm cooperation between aggregator and storages are presented. In
this same section, the Nash axiomatic bargaining model is presented and used to predict the
profit split that the aggregator and storages would negotiate. Section V concludes this paper.
II. MARKET AND STORAGE MODELS
In this section we describe the energy storage model and the market in which they interact.
We also lay out two different scenarios: i) one where the storages cooperate to maximize the
aggregate profit, and ii) another where the storages play a non-cooperative game and individually
maximize profits. We refer to the former as the grand coalition (GC) solution and to the latter
as the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution.
A. Market model
The price of energy at time t, p[t]
(
d[t]
)
, is sensitive to energy demanded or supplied by the
storages and is given by
p[t]
(
d[t]
)
= β [t] + γ[t]
∑
i∈I
d
[t]
i ∀t ∈ T
where d[t] represents the actions of all storages at time t. Let d[t]i ∈ R denote the energy purchased
(when d[t]i > 0) or sold (when d[t]i < 0) by the ith storage at time t. The set of all storages is
denoted by I and has size n. The constant β [t] is the price when the net purchases made by all
storages is zero and γ[t] is a positive constant that determines the sensitivity of price to energy
demand. The set of all time periods is denoted by T and has size nt.
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4B. Storage model
Storages are agents that can buy energy at some time and sell it at another. The net energy
purchased and sold of every storage is required to be zero and is expressed by∑
t∈T
d
[t]
i = 0 ∀i ∈ I. (1)
Because this paper seeks to emphasize the interaction between storages, other constraints such
as energy and/or power limit are modeled by a cost function associated with each storage.
The profit for the ith storage can be expressed as
πi(di;d−i) =
∑
t∈T
{
−p[t]
(
d[t]
)
· d
[t]
i −ci
(
d
[t]
i
)}
where di and d−i are the strategy choices of storage i and the strategy choices of all storages
excluding storage i, respectively. We assume a bounded strategy space for all storages. The
battery degradation, efficiency, and/or energy transaction costs of storage i are represented by
the cost function ci(·). It is known that as the depth of discharge increases, the costs of utilizing
storage increases faster than linear [17], [18]. Throughout this paper we assume a quadratic
function of the form ci(x) = ǫi2 x
2 that captures faster-than-linear increasing costs. The positive
constant ǫi is a storage specific cost coefficient.
Now we define the GC and the NE solutions. In the GC solution
d∗ = argmax
d
∑
i∈I
πi(di;d−i) (2)
s.t.
∑
t∈T
d
[t]
i = 0 (λi) ∀i ∈ I
the aggregate profit of the energy storages is maximized. The dual variables of the equality
constraints are denoted by λi and the GC solution is denoted by d∗.
In the NE solution
d′i = argmax
di
πi(di;d−i) ∀i ∈ I (3)
s.t.
∑
t∈T
d
[t]
i = 0 (λi)
each storage maximizes its own profit given the strategy choices of all other storages. The Nash
equilibrium (NE) for storage i is denoted by d′i. In the NE, no player has an incentive to deviate
form his or her strategy.
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5For readability and to convey intuition about the problem we consider a two-period case
throughout the rest of this section and section III. In subsection III-C we generalize our results
to nt time periods.
C. Solution to the two-period GC and NE solutions
In this subsection it is shown that the NE yields a lower aggregate profit with respect to the
GC strategy. This motivates the need to “fix” the NE solution. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, let β [2] − β [1] = 1. From constraint (1), d[1]i = −d[2]i for the two period case. A
solution for the ith storage is denoted by di = d[1]i = −d
[2]
i .
Lemma 1: As n→∞, the aggregate profit given by the GC solution increases and approaches
a finite positive number while the aggregate profit under the NE solution approaches zero.
1) Numerical example: Throughout the numerical examples γ = 1, n = 2, and nt = 2. Both
storages have cost coefficients of ǫi = 1.
The GC solution is d∗i = 1/6 (i.e. each storage charges 1/6 in the first period and discharges
the same amount in the second period). On the other hand, the NE is d′i = 1/5. The aggregate
profit under the GC solution is 1/6 while the aggregate profit under the NE is lower at 4/25.
The NE oversupplies storage services with respect to the GC solution. The storages move
more energy across time but the price difference between buying and selling periods is smaller
and thus the NE profit is smaller. Figure 1 shows the aggregate profit for both the GC and the
NE as a function of number of storages.
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Figure 1. Aggregate profits for identical storages as a function of n under the CG and NE solutions. The blue line is the limit
of the GC profit as n→∞. The parameters are ǫi = 1 ∀i ∈ I and γ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: Using di = d[1]i = −d[2]i , β [2] − β [1] = 1, and nt = 2, the Lagrangian
function of the problem (2) is L(di) =
∑
i∈I
{
di − diγ
∑
j∈I di − ǫid
2
i
}
and its Karush-Kuhn-
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6Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions
∂L(di)
∂di
= 1− 2γ
∑
j∈I
dj − 2ǫidi = 0 ∀ i ∈ I (4)
are satisfied by d∗i = 1/2ǫi
(
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)
. We show this by replacing di in (4) by d∗i :
∂L(d∗i )
∂d∗i
= 1−
γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
−
1
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
= 0 ∀i ∈ I.
In the NE, no storage has the incentive to unilaterally change his or her strategy. Equivalently,
for every i, d′i solves max∑
t∈T d
[t]
i =0
πi(di;d
′
−i) [19]. Each player’s Lagrangian function of
problem (3) is Li(di) = di − diγ
∑
j∈I dj − ǫid
2
i ∀i ∈ I and their KKT optimality conditions
∂Li(di)
∂di
= 1− γ
∑
j∈I
dj − (γ + 2ǫi) di = 0 ∀ i ∈ I (5)
are satisfied by d′i = 1/(2ǫi + γ)
(
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
2ǫj+γ
)
∀i ∈ I. When ǫi > 0 ∀i ∈ I or γ > 0, the system
of equations described by (5) has a unique solution. It follows that the NE is unique.
We now show that the profit under the NE approaches zero while the profit under the GC
approaches 1/4γ as the number of storages increases. The profit to be shared among the storages
under the GC solution is∑
i∈I
πi(d
∗
i ,d
∗
−i)=
∑
i∈I
{
d∗i−d
∗
iγ
∑
j∈I
d∗j−ǫid
∗2
i
}
=
γ
(∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)2
4
(
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)2 .
As n→∞,
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
→∞ and the aggregate profit made by the storages under the GC solution
approaches 1/4γ.
To show that the NE aggregate profit goes to zero as the number of storages increase, we
assume ǫi = 0 ∀ i ∈ I. Then, an upper bound for aggregate profit under NE is given by∑
i∈I
πi(d
′
i,d
′
−i)=
∑
i∈I
{
d′i−d
′
iγ
∑
j∈I
d′j
}
=
n
(1 + n)2
→ 0 as n→∞.
The lower bound must be non-negative as he or she can always choose di = 0 to achieve a zero
profit. It follows that as n→∞, the aggregate profit under the NE approaches zero. 
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7III. FIXING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM VIA ARTIFICIAL COST FUNCTIONS
In this section we study the use of artificial cost functions (ACFs) to “fix” the NE. We would
like to find a set of ACFs g[t]i (·) such that when the storages incur it, the NE is equal to the GC
solution. The ACF is effectively a control signal that penalizes deviations from the GC solution.
We refer to the NE under the ACF as the “artificial” Nash equilibrium (ANE). Having a NE
that equals the GC solution is desirable because: 1) the GC aggregate profit is larger than the
NE aggregate profit, 2) it is strategically stable, and 3) it is self-enforcing [19].
The idea of fixing an undesirable NE outcomes using a cost function was presented in [20].
However, revenue neutrality (which we will define shortly) is not a concern in their context.
A. Nash equilibrium under artificial cost functions
The two-period profit for storage i when exposed to the ACF is
πAi (di;d−i) = di − diγ
∑
i∈I
di −
ǫi
2
d2i − gi(di)
where gi(di) = g[1]i (di) + g
[2]
i (−di) and the ANE solution is denoted by
di = argmax
di
πAi (di;d−i) ∀i ∈ I. (6)
Lemma 2: There exists a cost function of the form gi(di) = aid2i + bidi ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T such
that:
• The ANE solution of problems (6) equals the solution of problem (2) (i.e. di = d∗i ∀i ∈ I).
• It is revenue neutral (i.e. gi(di) = 0 ∀i ∈ I).
Moreover, the coefficients of gi(·) are given by
ai= −γ
(
1− ǫi
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)
∀i ∈ I
bi= −
ai
2ǫi
(
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
) ∀i ∈ I.
Note that ai and bi only depend on individual information (ǫi), public information (γ), and
on the sum of other storages’ characteristics (∑j∈I 1ǫj ). The implication of this is that the GC
solution can be reached in a distributed fashion, without the need of each storage disclosing its
information to the rest of the storages.
August 31, 2018 DRAFT
8Proof of Lemma 2: The coefficients of the ACF and di must satisfy the following system of
equations
∂πAi (di;d−i)
∂di
=1−bi−γdi−γ
∑
j∈I
dj−2(ǫi+ai)di=0 ∀i ∈ I. (7a)
∂L(di)
∂di
= 1− 2γ
∑
j∈I
dj − 2ǫidi = 0 ∀ i ∈ I (7b)
aidi = −bi ∀i ∈ I. (7c)
Equations (7a) and (7b) ensure that in addition to satisfying each player’s individual profit
maximization problem, the ANE satisfies the GC solution. Equation (7c) ensures revenue neu-
trality. From β [2] − β [1]− = 1, the solutions of both the GC and the NE are non-negative. Thus
aid
2
i + bidi = 0 is replaced by (7c).
It is straight forward to show that ai, bi, and d∗i satisfy (7a) by using the expressions shown
in Lemmas 1 and 2
∂πAi (di;d−i)
∂di
=1−
γ
(
1−ǫi
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)
−γǫi
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
−zi
2ǫi
(
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
) = 0
where zi = 2 (ǫ+ ai) + γ. By Lemma 1, d∗i satisfies (7b). We can conclude that di = d∗i .
Finally, we show revenue neutrality (i.e. gi(di) = 0 ∀i ∈ I):
gi(di)=aid
2
i + bidi
=
−γ
(
1− ǫi
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)
4ǫ2i
(
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)2+ γ
(
1− ǫi
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)
4ǫ2i
(
1 + γ
∑
j∈I
1
ǫj
)2 =0.

B. Sensitivity analysis of the artificial cost function
In this subsection we show the ACF aggregate profit is robust to misestimations of the
parameters needed to compute the ACF. Figures 2 and 3 show the effect of overestimating
or underestimating
∑
i∈I
1
ǫi
and γ, respectively, by 30% on the aggregate profit. Even with large
misestimations, the GC aggregate profit remains considerably higher than the NE aggregate profit
for most n.
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Figure 2. Aggregate profits as a function of number of storages participating. The lines
∑
i
1
ǫi
30% and
∑
i
1
ǫi
− 30%
correspond to overestimation and underestimation, respectively, of
∑
i∈I
1
ǫi
.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
n
A
g
g
re
g
a
te
p
ro
fi
t
 
 
GC γ 30% γ -30% NE
Figure 3. Aggregate profits as a function of number of storages participating. The lines γ 30% and γ − 30% correspond to
overestimation and underestimation, respectively, of γ.
C. Generalization to nt time periods
In this subsection we generalize Lemma 2 to an arbitrary number of periods.
Lemma 3: There exist a set cost functions of the form g[t]i (d
[t]
i ) =
a
[t]
i
2
d
[t]2
i +b
[t]
i d
[t]
i ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T
such that:
• The ANE of problems (3) equals the solution of problem (2) (i.e. d[t]i = d[t]∗i ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T ).
• It is revenue neutral (i.e. ∑t∈T g[t]i (d[t]i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I).
The upper plot in Figure 4 shows the total energy purchases under both the NE and GC. The
lower plot in Figure 4 shows the price under both the NE and GC in a 24 time period game.
Because more energy is moved in the NE solution, the price under the NE solution, p[t]
(
d[t]
′
)
, is
considerably flatter than under the GC solution p[t]
(
d[t]∗
)
. Even though the NE solution moves
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more energy across time, the price difference is smaller and their profits are lower. For this
reason the storages may be inclined to cooperate to increase their aggregate profit.
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′
Figure 4. The upper plot in Figure 4 shows the total energy purchases under both the NE
∑
i∈I
d
[t]
i
′
and GC
∑
i∈I
d
[t]∗
i . The
lower plot shows the parameter β[t], price under the GC solution p[t]
(
d
[t]∗
)
, and price under the NE solution p[t]
(
d
[t]′
)
. The
price parameter β[t] is the day-ahead price in the PJM interconnection during 01/02/2011 [21]. The parameter γ[t] is randomly
generated but proportional to β[t] to simulate the increasing slope of the typical energy supply curve. The number of storages
is n = 20 and their cost coefficients are randomly generated.
Proof of Lemma 3: We would like to show the existence of the set of functions g[t]i (·). To
do so, we restrict ourselves to the subset of functions whose revenue is zero for every period
(i.e. g[t]i (d
[t]
i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T ). Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, in order to find the
coefficients of the artificial cost functions, we solve the following system of equations for d[t]i ,
a
[t]
i , b
[t]
i ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T and λi ∀i ∈ I
∂LAi (d
[t]
i , λi)
∂d
[t]
i
=−β [t]− b[t]i −γ
[t]
∑
j∈I
d
[t]
j −
(
ǫi+γ
[t]+ a
[t]
i
)
d
[t]
i
+ λi=0 ∀ i ∈ I, t ∈ T (8a)
∂L(d
[t]
i , λi)
∂d
[t]
i
= −β [t] − 2γ[t]
∑
j∈I
d
[t]
j − ǫid
[t]
i + λi = 0 (8b)
∀ i ∈ I, t ∈ T
∂L(d
[t]
i , λi)
∂λ
[t]
i
=
∑
t∈T
d
[t]
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I (8c)
a
[t]
i
2
d
[t]2
i + b
[t]
i d
[t]
i ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T (8d)
August 31, 2018 DRAFT
11
where LAi (d
[t]
i , λi) is the Lagrangian function of the nt time periods individual profit maximization
problem. Equations (8a) ensure that d[t]i satisfies the ANE. Equations (8b) ensure that the solution
satisfies the GC solution while equations (8c) enforce the equality constraints of each storage.
Finally, equation (8d) ensures revenue neutrality.
The solution to the multiple period GC problem is d[t]∗i =
∑
k
β[k]−β[t]
z[k]
ǫiz[t]
∑
k
1
z[k]
∀ i ∈ I, t ∈ T and
λ∗i =
∑
t
β[t]
z[t]∑
t
1
z[t]
∀ i ∈ I where z[t] = 1 + 2γ[t]
∑
j ǫ
−1
j . It is straight forward to show that they
satisfy the KKT conditions of the GC problem given by equations (8a) and (8c).
From the multiple period GC solution, when β [t] <
∑
k
β[k]
z[k]∑
k
1
z[k]
then d[t]∗i > 0 ∀ i ∈ I, t ∈ T .
Denote the set of such time periods as T1. The rest of the time periods (when d[t]i is non-positive)
are in the set T2. We can then replace the ACF revenue neutrality requirement (8d) with
a
[t]
i d
[t]
i + 2b
[t]
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T1 (9a)
a
[t]
i d
[t]
i − 2b
[t]
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T2. (9b)
We substitute the term a[t]i d
[t]
i in (8a) with either −2b[t]i or 2b[t]i depending on whether t is in
T1 or in T2. Finally, instead of solving the system of non-linear equations described by (8) we
solve the following system of linear equations for the variables d[t]i , λi, and b
[t]
i :
− β [t]+ b
[t]
i −γ
[t]
∑
j∈I
d
[t]
j −
(
ǫi+γ
[t]
)
d
[t]
i +λi=0 ∀ i∈I, t∈T1 (10a)
− β [t]− 3b
[t]
i −γ
[t]
∑
j∈I
d
[t]
j −
(
ǫi+γ
[t]
)
d
[t]
i +λi=0 ∀ i∈I, t∈T2 (10b)
(8b), (8c).
Equations (10a), (10b), and (8b) can be expressed in matrix notation as
M
[t]
j

d[t]
b[t]

+ I2λ =

1β [t]
1β [t]

 ∀ t ∈ Tj , j = 1, 2
where
M
[t]
j =

−γ[t]11T −E− γ[t]I1 cjI1
−2γ[t]11T − E 0

 , c1 = 1, c2 = −3.
The vector 1 ∈ Rn is an all ones vector and E ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix whose iith entry is
ǫi. The symbol Ij ∈ Rj·n×n represents j vertically concatenated identity matrices. The ith entries
of vectors d[t] ∈ Rn, b[t] ∈ Rn, and λ ∈ Rn are d[t]i , b
[t]
i , and λi respectively.
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We can further compact equations (10a), (10b), (8b), and (8c) to

M I2nt
N Z




d
b
λ

 =


β
β
0


where M ∈ R2n·nt×2n·nt is a block diagonal matrix whose ttth block is M[t]i , d = [d[1]T , . . .d[nt]T ]T ,
M
[t]
j , b = [b
[1]T . . . b[nt]T ]T , and β = [β [1]1T . . . β [nt]1T ]T . The equation
[
N Z
] [
dT bT λT
]T
=
0 represents equations (8c). The matrix N ∈ Rn×2nt·n is constructed by horizontally concatenat-
ing
[
I1 Z
]
nt times where Z ∈ Rn×n all-zero matrix.
Using Gaussian elimination, it is straightforward to show that matrix

M I2·nt
N Z

 is full rank.
It follows that it is invertible and the system of equations (10a), (10b), (8b), and (8c) has a
unique solution.
Equations (9a) and (9b) can be used to find coefficients a[t]i . 
IV. COOPERATION VIA AGGREGATOR
In this section we explore the possibility of the storages reaching the GC solution by coop-
erating with a central entity that we refer to as the “aggregator.” In this setting, the storages do
not have access to the wholesale market but instead buy/sell energy from/to an aggregator. The
aggregator determines the prices paid by/to the storages.
Previous work on aggregators [6], [22], [23] assume cooperation between aggregator and stor-
ages. In this work, however, we analyze possible outcomes of the aggregator-storage interaction
and do not assume that the aggregator will cooperate with the storages and vice versa. The
aggregator-storage game is modeled as a simultaneous move game. We show that the single-
shot NE is inefficient, explore the possibility of aggregator-storage cooperation in the longterm,
and derive conditions for cooperation.
A. Aggregator model
The aggregator profits by purchasing or selling energy on the wholesale market described
in section II and in turn selling to or buying from the storages. For every time period, the
aggregator determines the price of energy that each storage pays and the storages decide how
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much to purchase from or sell to the aggregator. The prices sent by the aggregator are assumed
to be bounded. The aggregator’s profit from trading with player i is denoted by
πa,i(τ i;di)=
∑
t∈T
{
τ
[t]
i d
[t]
i − p
[t]
(
d[t]
)
· d
[t]
i
}
where τ i and di are the strategies of the aggregator and storage i, respectively. The strategy
space of the aggregator is the set of possible price schedules that it can send to the storage.
The strategy space of each storage is the set of all feasible charge/discharge schedules and is
assumed to be bounded. The energy price that storage i pays at time t is denoted by τ [t]i .
B. Storage problem under an aggregator
With the aggregator acting as a middle-man between the wholesale market and the storages,
the storages are insensitive to the wholesale market prices, and only respond to the prices sent
by the aggregator. Let
πi(di; τ i) =
∑
t∈T
{
−τ
[t]
i d
[t]
i −
ǫi
2
d
[t]2
i
}
denote the profit of the ith storage under an aggregator.
In the NE solution under an aggregator, the storage and aggregator make their strategy choices
either simultaneously or without knowledge of the other player’s choices. The game can be
expressed as
τ i = argmax
τmini ≤τ
[t]
i ≤τ
max
i
πa,i(τ i;di) (11a)
di = argmax∑
t∈T d
[t]
i =0 (λi)
πi(di; τ i) (11b)
where every player independently maximizes its own profit. The prices that the aggregator can
send to the storage are bounded by τmini and τmaxi .
Lemma 4: Both players earn a profit of zero in all Nash equilibria of game (11).
1) Numerical example: Assume that τmini = −1 and τmaxi = 1. Denote τi = τ [2]i − τ [1]i . First
we analyze the aggregator’s best response given the storage’s strategy. If the storage chooses
di > 0, the aggregator’s best response is τi = −2. On the other hand if the storage chooses
di < 0,the aggregators best response is τi = 2. If the storage chooses di = 0, the aggregator’s
best response is any feasible τi.
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Now we analyze the storage’s best response given the aggregator’s strategy. Both storages
maximize their profits by playing di = τi/2. It is easy to see that the only stable NE is di = 0
and τ i is any feasible τi. It follows that the profit is zero for both the aggregator and the storage
as no transactions occur.
It is likely that the aggregator and storages interact repeatedly over time. Thus, there might
be the possibility of fostering longterm cooperation between the storages and the aggregator
to achieve the GC solution. We will present a infinitely repeated game model and show under
which conditions cooperation can be sustained in the longterm.
Proof of Lemma 4: It is straight forward to show that, the storages actions, the aggregator
maximizes its profit by sending price schedule
τ
[t]
i =


τmini if d
[t]
i < 0
τmaxi if d
[t]
i > 0
τmini ≤ τ
[t]
i ≤ τ
max
i if d
[t]
i = 0
∀ t ∈ T .
The KKT conditions of problem (11b) are
−τ [t] − ǫid
[t]
i + λi = 0 ∀t ∈ T∑
t∈T
d
[t]
i = 0
and are satisfied by d
[t]
i =
1
nt
∑
k∈T τ
[k]
i −τ
[t]
i
ǫi
∀t ∈ T for a given set of τ [t]i and λi = 1nt
∑
k∈T τ
[k]
i .
The Nash equilibria should satisfy problems (11). It follows the Nash equilibria is τ [t]i =
a ∀ t ∈ T , where a is a constant such that τmini ≤ a ≤ τmaxi , and d
[t]
i = 0 ∀ t ∈ T . Any other
strategy choices are unstable. Since the storage does not purchase or sell energy in all Nash
equilibria, the profit for both the aggregator and storage is zero. 
C. Repeated game model
We assume that the single-stage game (11) is repeated indefinitely. The longterm profit made
by each player is the discounted sum of the single-stage profits. Denote the longterm profit made
by the aggregator from trading with storage i as
π∞a,i =
∞∑
k=0
δkπa,i(τ
(k)
i ;d
(k)
i )
August 31, 2018 DRAFT
15
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount rate (e.g. interest rate). The symbols τ (k)i and d(k)i denote strategy
decisions for the kth time the single-stage game is played. Similarly, the longterm profit of
storage i is given by
π∞i =
∞∑
k=0
δkπi(d
(k)
i ; τ
(k)
i ).
1) Strategy space for the repeated game: In order to keep the repeated game tractable, the
strategy spaces of the aggregator and storages are reduced to specific cooperation and defection
strategies.
2) Cooperation strategies: The cooperation strategy of the aggregator is given by
τ
(k)
i =


τˆ i if d
(m)
i = dˆi ∀ m < k
τ i otherwise
∀i ∈ I.
It describes the strategy in which during the kth game, the aggregator sends storage i a previously
agreed price schedule τˆ i if storage i has played an agreed dˆi during all previous times. If storage
i fails to uphold its commitment, the aggregator stops cooperating and plays the NE solution
(τ i) for the subsequent times the game is played. Likewise,
d
(k)
i =


dˆi if τ
(m)
i = τˆ i ∀ m < k
di otherwise
∀i ∈ I
describes the cooperation strategy of storage i. Storage i plays an agreed dˆi if the aggregator
has upheld its commitment to send an agreed τˆ i during all previous times the game has been
played. If the aggregator fails to uphold its commitment, the storage i stops cooperating and
plays the NE solution (di) for the subsequent times the game is played.
3) Defection strategies: We now describe the defection or “cheating” strategies that the
aggregator and the storage can play. We assume that all players are aware that, as described
in section IV-C1, players stop cooperating when the opponent fails to uphold its commitment.
Therefore, if one of the players decides to cheat, it will do so by maximizing its single-stage
profit. The aggregator’s single-stage profit derived from storage i is maximized during a single
game by playing
τDi = argmax
τmini ≤τ
[t]
i ≤τ
max
i
πa,i(τ i; dˆi).
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Similarly, storage i maximizes its profit for a given τˆ i during a single game by playing the
defection strategy
dDi = argmax∑
i d
[t]
i =0
πi(di; τˆ i) ∀i ∈ I.
In the following subsection we show, given dˆi, which choices of τˆ i ensure that every player
never plays its defection strategy.
D. Ensuring cooperation in an infinitely repeated game
We would like to choose a τˆ i (or equivalently, a profit split between storages and aggregator)
such that cooperation is sustained by all players. Problems
v∗i = arg sup
vi∈R+
π∞a,i and w
∗
i = arg sup
wi∈R+
π∞i ∀i ∈ I
are solved by the aggregator and the storages, respectively, to determine when to defect (if at
all). The strategy vi ∈ R+ is the time the aggregator decides to defect from cooperation with
storage i. Likewise, wi ∈ R+ denotes the time storage i decides to stop cooperating with the
aggregator. To ensure longterm cooperation, w∗i =∞ ∀i ∈ I and v∗i =∞ ∀i ∈ I.
Lemma 5: Cooperation with every storage is sustained by the aggregator, or equivalently,
v∗i =∞ ∀i ∈ I when all τˆ i are in the sets Aai = {τ i|πa(τ n:n; dˆn:n) ≥ (1−δ)πa(τDn; dˆn:n)}.
Here, πa(·; ·) =
∑
i∈I πa,i(·; ·). The vector dˆn:n denotes a vector of storage actions in which
storages i < n play their NE and storage n cooperates. Similarly, τˆ n:n denotes a vector of
aggregator actions in which it plays the NE with storages i < n and cooperates with storage
n. The vector τDn represents the action of the aggregator where τDni = τ i ∀i < n (i.e. NE),
τDni = τ
D
i if i = n (i.e. defection strategy).
Similarly, cooperation is sustained by storage i, or equivalently, w∗i = ∞ when τˆ i is in the
set Asi = {τ i| (1− δ) πi(d
D
i ; τ i) ≤ πi (d
∗
i ; τ i)}.
When τˆ i is at the boundary of Aai (Asi), the aggregator (storage) is indifferent between
cooperating and not cooperating with storage i. We assume that when indifferent, both the
aggregator and storage cooperate. Both parties cooperate when τˆ i ∈ Ai where Ai = Aai ∩ Asi.
1) Numerical example: Consider a repeated aggregator-storage game with the same aggregator
and storages described in the previous examples. We assume that the discount rate is δ = 0.95.
As it will be shown in Lemma 6, the aggregator and storages agree on the GC solution: dˆi =
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Figure 5. Longterm profits of the aggregator (π∞a,i) and storage (π∞i ) as a function of agreed τˆi. For the dashed red line, the
storage cheats while the aggregator cooperates. Conversely, for the dashed blue line, the aggregator cheats while the storage
cooperates. Both the storage and the aggregator cooperates when τˆi is such that the cooperation profit is greater than the
non-cooperation profit for both players.
d∗i =
1
6
∀i = 1, 2. As mentioned in the proof of Lemma 5, we assume that both the aggregator
and storages defect from cooperation by maximizing their single game profits so τDi = −2 and
dDi =
τˆi
2
∀i = 1, 2.
The aggregator maximizes its longterm profit by choosing values for vi ∈ R+ ∀ i = 1, 2 such
that its longterm profit
π∞a,i =
1
9
− 1
6
τˆi + 0.95
vi
(
τˆ2
6
− 4
45
)
1− 0.95
∀ i = 1, 2
is maximized. The aggregator maximizes its longterm profit by choosing to not cooperate (i.e.
vi = 0) if τˆi6 − 445 is greater than zero. And chooses to cooperate indefinitely (i.e.vi = ∞) if
τˆi
6
− 4
45
is less than zero. When τˆi
6
− 4
45
= 0 the aggregator is indifferent between cooperating
and not cooperating. We assume that when indifferent, the aggregator cooperates. In order for
the aggregator to have the incentive to cooperate in the longterm, the aggregator must agree to
a price schedule such that τi . 0.53 ∀i = 1, 2.
Similarly, each storage maximizes its longterm profit by choosing values for wi ∈ R+ such
that
π∞i =
− 1
36
+ 1
6
τˆi + 0.95
wi
(
τˆ2i
80
− τˆi
6
+ 1
36
)
1− 0.95
is maximized. Storage i cooperates (i.e. chooses wi =∞) when τˆ
2
i
80
− τˆi
6
+ 1
36
≤ 0 or equivalently
when 0.17 . τˆi . 13.17. It follows every storage and the aggregator cooperate when the agreed
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price schedule satisfies 0.17 . τˆi . 0.53 ∀i = 1, 2. This range of price schedules that foster
cooperation between all players can be interpreted as a share in profits between the aggregator
and the storages. In the subsection that follows we use Nash’s axiomatic bargaining model to
predict that the aggregator and the storage will agree on the GC solution and that the profit will
be split equally among them when all players are risk neutral.
Proof of Lemma 5: First we show that for the aggregator to sustain cooperation with storage
i, τˆ i must be in the set Aai . The aggregator cooperates with storage i (i.e. sends agreed τˆ i) until
time vi, when it cheats (i.e. sends defection strategy τDi ). Then the repeated game profit for the
aggregator π∞a can be expressed as
π∞a =
n∑
j=1

δvjπa(τDj ; dˆj:n) +
vj−1∑
k=vj−1+1
δkπa(τˆ j:n; dˆj:n)

 (12)
where τDj denotes the action of the aggregator where τDji = τ i ∀i < j (i.e. NE), τDji = τDi if
i = j (i.e. defection strategy), and τDji = τˆ i ∀i > j (i.e. cooperation strategy), dˆj:n denotes a
vector of storage actions in which storages i < j play their NE and storages i ≥ j cooperate.
Similarly, τˆ j:n denotes a vector of aggregator actions in which it plays the NE with storages
i < j and cooperate with i ≥ j. It is assumed that the set of storages I is ordered such that
v1 ≤ v2 ≤ . . . ≤ vn and define v0 ≡ −1.
We can use the identity
∑b−1
k=a+1 δ
k = δ
a+1−δb
1−δ
to rewrite (12) as
π∞a =
n∑
j=1
{δvjπa(τ
Dj ; dˆj:n) +
δvj−1+1−δvj
1− δ
πa(τˆ j:n; dˆj:n)}
=
1
1−δ
( n∑
j=1
δvj[(1− δ)πa(τ
Dj ; dˆj:n)− πa(τˆ j:n; dˆj:n)]
+
n−1∑
j=0
δvj+1πa(τˆ j+1:n; dˆj+1:n)
)
. (13)
Since v0 = −1, δv0+1 = δ−1+1 = 1 and defining πa(τˆ n+1:n; dˆn+1:n) ≡ 0, equation (13) can be
rewritten as
π∞a =
1
1−δ
(
πa(τˆ ; dˆ) +
n∑
j=1
δvjαj
)
where αj = (1−δ)πa(τDj ; dˆj:n)−πa(τˆ j:n; dˆj:n)+δπa(τˆ j+1:n; dˆj+1:n). Notice that, since limvj→∞ δvj = 0
and the aggregator maximizes longterm profits, for the aggregator to choose vj = ∞, αj must
be less than or equal to zero.
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Of all possible orderings of the set I and d∗i ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ I, τˆj it is most constrained when
j = n, that is, when the least amount of players are in the market1. Thus, in order for the
aggregator to maintain cooperation with storage n, πa(τˆ n:n; dˆn:n) ≥ (1−δ)πa(τDn ; dˆn:n). The
storage maintains cooperation with all storages when the previous equation holds true for any
ordering of the set I.
Now we show that for storage i to sustain cooperation with the aggregator, τˆ i must be in the set
Asi . If we assume that storage i cooperates (i.e. plays dˆi) until it decides to cheat at time wi (i.e.
plays defection strategy dDi ), then the longterm profit of storage i, π∞i =
∑∞
k=0 δ
kπi(d
(k)
i ; τ
(k)
i )
can be expressed as
π∞i =
wi−1∑
k=0
δkπi(dˆi; τˆ i)+δ
wiπi(d
D
i ; τˆ i)+
∞∑
k=wi+1
δkπi(di; τ i). (14)
Using the identity
∑b−1
k=a+1 δ
k = δ
a+1−δb
1−δ
, equation (14) can be expressed as
π∞i =
1− δwi
1− δ
πi(dˆi; τˆ i)+δ
wiπi(d
D
i ; τˆ i)
=
1
1−δ
(
πi
(ˆ
di; τˆ i
)
+δwi
(
(1−δ)πi
(
dDi ; τˆ i
)
−πi
(
dˆi; τˆ i
)))
For storage i to indefinitely sustain cooperation with the aggregator, the term (1−δ)πi(dDi ; τˆ i)−
πi(dˆi; τˆ i) must be less or equal to zero. It follows that for both storages and aggregator to sustain
cooperation, τˆ i must be in both Asi and Aai . 
E. Profit split via Nash Bargaining
As shown previously, there are potentially infinitely many ways to split the profit and ensure
cooperation. In this section we use John Nash’s bargaining model to predict the profit split
between the aggregator and the storage. We restrict our analysis to cases where Ai 6= ∅ ∀i ∈ I.2
1) The Nash bargaining problem: In this subsection, we introduce Nash’s axiomatic approach
to bargaining [24]. Denote the set of possible bargaining outcomes of the aggregator and storage i
as Si and the solution to the bargaining problem as ξ (Si). Under Nash’s assumptions a bargaining
solution is a single point in a set of possible outcomes that satisfies the following axioms:
1If the aggregator has defected all previous n− 1 player, then there are more opportunities for arbitrage in the market (i.e. a
larger profit to be shared with the storage) and therefore a larger upside when cheating in the single shot game.
2The set Ai could be empty due to a combination of the following situations: a) the market is too crowded b) the value of
money depreciates too rapidly to ensure cooperation or c) the profitability of cheating is too great.
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• Pareto efficiency: Let uai (·) and usi(·) be the utility functions of the aggregator and storage
i respectively. If a, b ∈ Si, uai (a) > uai (b), and usi(a) > usi(b) then b 6= ξ (Si).
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If Si ⊆ Ti and ξ (Ti) ∈ Si, then ξ (Si) = ξ (Ti).
• Symmetry: If Si is symmetric (∃ uai (·), usi(·) such that if (a, b) ∈ Si then (b, a) ∈ Si) and
uai (·) and usi(·) exhibit this, then the bargaining solution has the form a = (a, a) = ξ (Si)
and usi(a) = uai (a).
In this analysis, the aggregator is assumed to independently bargain with each storage. This
assumption is reasonable because, by the Pareto efficiency axiom, the agreed storage actions
will be the GC solution (i.e. dˆi = d∗i ). Then, the only thing that is left for negotiation is the
price schedules sent to each storage. The price schedule sent to a storage does not affect other
storages.
Lemma 6: If both players are risk neutral the aggregator and storage i will agree on a τˆ i that
equally splits the GC profit and fosters longterm cooperation.
By agreeing to act under the coordination of an aggregator, the storages share some of the
profit with the aggregator who is essentially a middle man. However, as seen in figure 5, as the
number of storages increases, splitting the GC profit with an aggregator rather than obtaining
the NE profit becomes increasingly lucrative.
It is worth noting that, as shown by [25], if one of the players is more risk adverse than the
other, its share of the profit will decrease. Conversely, if a player is more risk-loving than the
other, its share of the profit will increase.
2) Numerical example: By the Pareto efficiency axiom, dˆi = d∗i = 1/6 ∀i = 1, 2. Any other
choice of dˆi will yield a lower total profit and could be improved without any player being
affected by choosing instead d∗i . Similarly, by Pareto efficiency, τˆi will be one that fosters
longterm cooperation 0.17 . τˆi . 0.53 ∀i = 1, 2.
It follows that the aggregator longterm profit that the aggregator derives from trading with
storage i is π∞a,i =
(
1
9
− 1
6
τˆi
)
/(1− 0.95) where 0.17 . τˆi . 0.53 ∀i = 1, 2. Similarly, the longterm
profit for storage i is π∞i =
(
− 1
36
+ 1
6
τˆi
)
/(1− 0.95) where 0.17 . τˆi . 0.53 ∀i = 1, 2.
We can express the aggregator’s longterm profit derived from trading with storage i as a
function of the profit of storage i and normalize it by their joint longterm profit as follows:
π˜∞a,i = 1− π˜
∞
i where 0 ≤ π˜
∞
i ≤
11
15
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where π˜∞a,i and π˜∞i are the aggregator and storage longterm profit, respectively, normalized by
the joint longterm profit 5
3
.
From [25] and assuming that all players are risk-neutral (i.e. their utility function is equal to
their profit), the solution to the bargaining problem is given by
deal = argmax
0≤π˜∞
i
≤ 11
15
{π˜∞i (1− π˜
∞
i )} = 1/2
which maps to a price schedule of τˆi = 5/12.
Proof of Lemma 6: By Pareto efficiency, dˆi = d∗i and τˆ i ∈ Ai. Since we assume that the
aggregator and storages are risk neutral, their utilities are equal to their profits. The longterm
profit of the aggregator from trading with storage i is
uai (τˆ i) =
∞∑
k=0
δkπa,i(τˆ i;d
∗
i) =
πa,i(τˆ i;d
∗
i)
1− δ
∀ τˆ i ∈ A
s
i
and the utility of storage i
usi(τˆ i) =
∞∑
k=0
δkπi(d
∗
i ; τˆ i) =
πi(d
∗
i ; τˆ i)
1− δ
∀ τˆ i ∈ A
s
i
is the longterm profit from cooperating with the aggregator.
Define the set possible agreement outcomes between the aggregator and storage i as
S˜deali = {( u
a
i (τˆ i), u
s
i(τˆ i) )| τˆ i ∈ Ai}
and the non-agreement outcomes as h˜i = (h˜ai , h˜si) = (0, 0). The set of possible outcomes is then
S˜i = S˜
deal
i ∪hi. Since h˜i /∈ S˜deali , S˜i is not necessarily convex. We define the possible bargaining
outcomes as the convex hull of S˜i, (i.e. Si = conv(S˜i)).
From the Pareto efficiency axiom, we know that the deal will lie on S˜deali . From the symmetry
axiom, we know that uai (ξ (Si)) = usi(ξ (Si)). Hence, the aggregator and the storage choose a
τˆ i that equally splits the profit.
A way of defining the solution function ξ (Si) is given by Binmore in [25]. Binmore shows
that ξ (Si) = argmax(uai (τˆ i),usi(τˆ i))∈Si≥h˜i (u
a
i (τˆ i)− h
a
i )(u
s
i(τˆ i)− h
s
i). From the Pareto efficiency
axiom we know that ξ (Si) ∈ S˜deali . Substituting (hai , hsi) = (0, 0) and from the independence of
irrelevant alternatives axiom, we arrive at
ξ (Si) = argmax
(uai (τˆ i),u
s
i(τˆ i))∈S˜
deal
i ≥(0,0)
uai (τˆ i)u
s
i(τˆ i) (15)
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Notice that we can write the longterm utility of the aggregator from cooperating with storage
i as a function of the storage’s utility
uai (τˆ i)=
1
1− δ
∑
t∈T
{
−p[t]
(
d[t]∗
)
· d
[t]∗
i −
ǫi
2
d
[t]∗2
i
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
πtotal=Total profit to be shared
−usi(τˆ i).
Normalizing by the total profit to be shared, πtotal, the longterm utility of the aggregator from
cooperating with storage i can be written as: u˜ai (τˆ i) = 1 − u˜si(τˆ i), where u˜ai (τˆ i) = u
a
i
(τˆ i)/πtotal
and u˜si(τˆ i) = u
s
i(τˆ i)/πtotal.
We can rewrite (15) as
ξ (Si) = argmax
(u˜si(τˆ i),1−u˜
s
i(τˆ i))∈S˜
deal
i ≥(0,0)
u˜si(τˆ i) (1− u˜
s
i(τˆ i)) .
whose solution is u˜si(τˆ i) = 12 and thus u˜
a
i (τˆ i) =
1
2
. 
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the profit of a group of energy storages under competition and cooperation. We
showed that without cooperation, the aggregate profit of the storages approaches zero as the
number of storages grows. We presented two approaches to foster cooperation. In the first
approach, storages are exposed to artificial cost functions, and their self-interested strategy
maximizes the aggregate profit. In the second approach, the aggregate profit is maximized
with the help of an aggregator. The interaction of the aggregator and storages is modeled as
a simultaneous move game whose Nash equilibrium is undesirable. We derive the conditions
(i.e. profit split between aggregator and storages) that ensure aggregator-storage cooperation.
Finally, we use Nash’s axiomatic approach to bargaining to predict that risk-neutral players will
equally split the available profit.
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